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DNSSEC – AUTHENTICATED DENIAL OF EXISTENCE :
UNDERSTANDING ZONE ENUMERATION
SACHIN VASANT
ABSTRACT
Over the years DNS has proved to be an integral part of the internet infracstructure.
For our purposes, DNS is simply a large scale distributed database that maps human-
readable domain names to network recognizable IP addresses. Unfortunately, authenticity
of responses was not integral to the initial DNS design. This lead to the possibility of
a very practical forgery of responses as displayed by Kaminsky’s cache poisoning attacks.
DNSSEC is primarily designed as a security extension of DNS, that guarantees authenticity
of DNS responses.
To answer invalid queries in an authenticated manner, DNSSEC initially employed
the NSEC records. To its credit, NSEC allowed nameservers to precompute signatures
for such negative responses offline. As a result, NSEC is highly scalable while preserving
the authenticity/correctness of responses. But, while doing so, NSEC leaks domains from
nameserver’s zone. This is called zone enumeration.
To counter zone enumeration, NSEC3 was deployed. It is a hashed authenticated denial
of existence of mechanism,i.e., it reveals the hashes of the zones in a domain. NSEC3 yet
allows offline signatures, and is scalable like NSEC. Unfortunately, hashes are vulnerable
to dictionary attacks a property exploited by conventional NSEC3 zone enumeration tool,
e.g., nsec3walkertool.
This leads us to investigate the possibility of constructing an authenticated denial of
existence of mechanism which yet allows offline cryptography. To do so, we first define the
security goals of a “secure” DNSSEC mechanism in terms of an Authenticated Database
System (ADS) with additional goals of privacy, that we define. Any protocol that achieves
these goals, maintains the integrity of DNSSEC responses and prevents zone enumeration.
We then show that any protocol that achieves such security goals, can be used to con-
iv
struct weak signatures that prevent selective forgeries. This construction, though a strong
indication, doesn’t confirm the impossibility of generating proofs offline.
To confirm that such proofs aren’t possible offline, we show attacks of zone enumeration
on two large classes of proofs. The provers/responders in this case either repeat proofs
non-negligibly often or select proofs as subsets from a pre-computed set of proof elements.
The attackers we present use a dictionary of all elements that are likely to occur in the
database/zone. The attackers prune the said dictionary to obtain the set of all elements in
the database (along with a few additional elements that are erroneously classified to be in
the database). These attackers minimize the number of queries made to such responders
and are loosely based on the paradigm of Probably Approximately Correct learning as
introduced by Valiant.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The domain name system (DNS) [25, 26] is an integral part of the modern Internet ar-
chitecture. Users intend to communicate with remote servers, which they identify using
descriptive “domain names” like foo.org. They use the DNS to resolve the IP addresses
of the server hosting the said domain name.
The DNS system primarily involves three parties,
Client The client is the end user in the system that wishes to have a domain name resolved.
Thus, it initiates a DNS lookup query.
Recursive Resolvers The recursive resolvers/recursors interface with the clients. They
are typically in the client’s network, but there are currently open resolvers too, spread
across the Internet. The resolvers receive queries from the clients, verify their cache
for responses. If not found, they resolve the query on behalf of the clients.
Nameservers The nameservers host the DNS data, i.e., the actual mapping between the
domain names and the IP addresses (among other data related to the said domain
names). The resolvers query the nameservers until they obtain the obtain the right
name server to return the required information corresponding to a domain.
To resolve names, the DNS system maintains a hierarchy of nameservers. Each name-
server contains a zone, which is its set of domains and referrals. The root nameservers
are at the top of the hierarchy and store the root zone, followed by the top-level domains
(TLDs)like .org,.edu etc. and the country-level TLDs (ccTLDs) like .in,.cn etc. These
are followed by more fine-grained zones, for example foo.org, bu.edu..
2Data in the zone is stored as resource records (RRs). A nameserver is authoritative
for a zone, if the details in the zone are consistent with what is generated at the actual
source of the zone. Some of the typical RRs are the A record which stores the IPv4 address
corresponding to a specified url, the AAAA record which stores the IPv6 address. The NS
record holds the nameserver to be referred to for the given the query. Some zones are
replicated in multiple servers. One of the servers is known as the master server for the
zone, and the others are the slaves. All updates are done at the master, and the zones of
the slaves are updated using zone-transfer protocols (AXFR).
The said information is used to lookup the domain required. The resolution of www.
bu.edu is illustrated in the figure. The query texts in the figure are based on the texts in
[8].
Figure 1.1: A sample resolution of www.bu.edu.
1.1 DNSSEC
Note that the DNS doesn’t have authentication integrated in its design. Thus, the resolvers
and clients have been susceptible to cache poisoning attacks like the Kaminsky bug [18].
Such attacks accentuated the need for authenticated DNS responses.
3The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) first introduced in 1999 [3], extends the DNS
to provide authenticated DNS responses. DNSSEC [5, 7, 6] aims to provide authentic
responses from the nameservers to the resolvers. The goal of authenticated delegation of
zones from masters to slaves, and authentic responses from the resolver to the client are
not in the purview of DNSSEC.
DNSSEC adds additional resource records, primarily, the DNSKEY, RRSIG and the
DS records. The DNSKEY records primarily holds the keys used to sign the zones (zone
signing keys, ZSK) or to sign the set of all DNSKEYs held in the zone (the key signing
keys, KSK). DS records are held by nodes higher up in the hierarchy. The DS record is the
hash of a KSK of the child node. RRSIG records consist of signatures on a particular type
of resource record set (RRset). An extension of the above lookup process using DNSSEC
is mentioned in figure 1.2: The verification of the resolution process entails the following
Figure 1.2: A sample resolution of www.bu.edu based on [8].
steps:
1. The recursive resolver verifies the signature corresponding to the received RRSIG for
4www.bu.edu using the corresponding DNSKEY record. If valid, it then verifies the
RRSIG corresponding to the said DNSKEY RRset.
2. The recursor then verifies the if the DNSKEY is indeed correct using the DS record
retrieved from edu. The signature corresponding to this DS is verified using the
DNSKEYs of edu. The signature corresponding to the DNSKEY RRset is also veri-
fied.
3. To verify if the DNSKEYs were indeed that of edu, the recursor verifies the DS record
from the root. The signature corresponding to this DS record is verified using the
root’s DNSKEY. The signature corresponding to the DNSKEY RRset is also verified.
Note that in the above recursion, the resolver doesn’t validate the DNSKEYs of the root. In
the true sense, it does validate the DNSKEYs. Here, the DNSKEYs of the root are stored
as trusted anchors in its initially configured cache. The root in DNSSEC terms becomes
a trusted anchor, above which validation isn’t necessary. The chain of servers upto that
the server validates all the way up to the trusted anchor is the authentication chain. In
case of partial deployment not all nameservers will be able to form an authentication chain
upto a trust anchor, thus forming an island of security. The recursive resolver can set
these name servers lower in the hierarchy as trusted anchors too, as long as it is certain of
the credentials of the keys it receives for these nameservers. For further details on trusted
anchors, we refer the readers to [5].
Note that every DNSSEC response requires at least one additional RRSIG record. Most
responses may also receive an accompanying DNSKEY. Therefore, the size of the responses
already exceed the accepted DNS packet lengths. Thus, DNSSEC requires the used of the
extended DNS, EDNS (defined in [34]). Thus, the length of DNSSEC responses is an
important design constraint, and sizes exceeding 4096 bits is considered disadvantageous.
51.2 Authenticated Denial of Existence – Zone Enumeration
We have earlier described the lookup procedure for a valid query that must exist in a zone.
Indeed, invalid queries need to be handled in the same vein too. In RFCs [5, 7, 6], a new
record NSEC (next secure) was proposed for the purpose. Suppose we ask an invalid query
y.foo.org to the nameserver hosting foo.org. The name server retrieves the two valid
domains in its zone that are closest to the query (say x.foo.org and z.foo.org) and
return the same as a NSEC record, accompanied with an RRSIG. Such NSEC records and
their RRSIGs can be pre-computed, since there are only finitely many such records per
zone.
A disadvantage with the NSEC records were, that a few adversarially generated invalid
queries could reveal the entire zone. Such an attack is called zone enumeration. In DNS,
the issue doesn’t arise, because, we have to explicitly query for an entity in the zone, to
obtain information about it. Even though DNSSEC doesn’t aim to provide confidentiality
[5], the zone enumeration is yet an issue. To quote [22],
An enumerated zone can be used, for example, as a source of probable e-mail
addresses for spam, or as a key for multiple WHOIS queries to reveal registrant
data that many registries may have legal obligations to protect. Many registries
therefore prohibit the copying of their zone data; however, the use of NSEC RRs
renders these policies unenforceable.
The issue could be mitigated by on-line signing. But on-line signing comes with a few
caveats. A few security concerns with on-line signing (quoting [35] verbatim) are:
1. On-demand signing requires that a zone’s authoritative servers have access to its
private keys. Storing private keys on well-known Internet-accessible servers may
make them more vulnerable to unintended disclosure.
2. Since generation of digital signatures tends to be computationally demanding, the
requirement for on-demand signing makes authoritative servers vulnerable to a denial
6of service attack.
3. If the responses are predictable, on-demand signing may enable a chosen-plaintext
attack on a zone’s private keys. Zones using this approach should attempt to use
cryptographic algorithms that are resistant to chosen-plaintext attacks. It is worth
noting that although DNSSEC has a ”mandatory to implement” algorithm, that is
a requirement on resolvers and validators – there is no requirement that a zone be
signed with any given algorithm.
Taking the above caveats into account, the rfc [22] proposes NSEC3 for DNSSEC.
The NSEC3 resource record returns a cryptographic hashes instead of the actual domains
for a queried invalid domain. So again, if we ask an invalid query y.foo.org to the
nameserver hosting foo.org, it returns h1 and h2 (corresponding to the hash of two values
say m.foo.org and b.foo.org in the zone), such that h1 < hash(y.foo.org) < h2. This
NSEC3 is of course accompanied by its RRSIG record. We have further details on the
same in the later chapters.
Note that, even in this case, zone-enumeration is yet possible although with a lot more
effort as compared to NSEC, as long as we obtain a suitable dictionary. In fact, it is yet
easier to enumerate a zone than in the case of DNS, because DNS requires us to query on
every individual element that we suspect lies in the zone. This has been exploited in the
nsec3walker tool [2]. In our work, we again illustrate a theoretically feasible attack on the
NSEC3. The attack in our work is for illustrative purposes only, to show why NSEC3 will
not achieve the security goals for privacy that we define.
The above caveats notwithstanding, there have been calls for online signing neverthe-
less. There have been DNSSEC tools like the PowerDNSSEC [17] and Phreebird [19] that
perform signing online. Also, using all-but-one signatures, one can do online signing for
invalid queries [15]. In this case, even in case of key-compromise, the adversary cannot
sign non-existence records for entities that are actually in the zone.
But, an offline authenticated denial of existence mechanism is yet desirable, especially
7to minimize the computational load on the servers. Thus, in our work, we examine the
possibility of the existence of such a desirable authenticated denial of existence mechanism.
For some large classes of functions, we are able launch zone enumeration attacks, thus
negating the possibility of denial mechanisms from such classes of functions.
1.3 Outline
Given that NSEC3 doesn’t prevent zone enumeration, it is interesting to verify if there
exists any protocol that can prevent zone enumeration while delegating all computations
using trapdoors offline. We think the answer for the same is in the negative. Our investi-
gations take two broad approaches:
1. We initially investigate the possibility of a reduction to cryptographic signatures. The
idea for the same would thus be to claim that if there exists a “secure” DNSSEC that
does not use any trapdoors in its online computation, then there exists signatures
which does only public key computations online. To do so, we first formally define the
security goals of DNSSEC using authenticated databases ([31]) and add our definition
of privacy to it (semantic security). Then we show that the same could be used to
construct signatures with weak unforgeability guarantees. The limitations in the
unforgeability guarantees stem from the fact that privacy in this case is limited to
protecting the database/zone and not the status of the entire space of domains.
2. We define two large classes of proof-systems that we think are the most logical meth-
ods to avoid online cryptography. First, there exists only a small set of proofs, each of
which is repeated non-negligibly often. This is a direct generalization of NSEC3. The
second class, uses a bounded set of proof components, where every proof is subset of
this set of proof components. We show that there exists “efficient” zone enumeration
adversaries (that use dictionaries) for both these classes of proof systems.
The following chapters essentially elaborate on the aforementioned approaches. Specif-
ically,
8Chapter 2. We define the security goals of DNSSEC using Authenticated databases in
section 2.1. We describe the current DNSSEC standard (with NSEC3) in the frame-
work of the said definition is section 2.2. To add to the same, we construct what an
offline version of a standard construction for zero-knowledge databases [10] in section
2.3. In section 2.4 we construct such signatures with weak unforgeability guarantees
from such “secure” DNSSEC protocols.
Chapter 3. Chapter 3 initiates our attempt with approach 2. We look at certain types of
zone enumeration adversaries. In section 3.1, we present two classes of attackers, the
oblivious attacker and the adaptive attacker. These attackers are loosely based on
uniform PAC learners. We then present oblivious attacks against NSEC3 and against
the aforementioned construction from zero-knowledge databases. The attacks against
NSEC3 are already well-known. We just fit the attack into our formal notion of zone-
enumeration adversaries to analyse its correctness and efficiency.
Chapter 4. In chapter 4, our goal is to illustrate oblivious attacks on the two large classes
of proof-systems. To do so, we require sampling tools, for example the epsilon nets.
In section 4.1, we present the requisite preliminaries. In section 4.2, we formally state
the class of functions that has bounded number of proofs, and hint on the attack using
the oblivious adversary. In section 4.3, we formally state the class of functions that
generate proofs from a set of proof elements, and state our attack on the same.
Chapter 2
Defining the Security of DNSSEC
We look at every stage of interaction in DNSSEC as to having three parties. The au-
thenticator is authoritative to the zone and holds the signing key for the zone, most likely
held in the master server of the zone. In other words, the authenticator is responsible for
generating proofs for the zone, and is the “offline” component of the the DNSSEC compo-
nent. The responder is the online component of the authoritative nameservers (including
the slave servers). They generate the required DNSSEC responses for every queries. The
recursive resolvers or the end clients (if they use the CD bit) that validate the DNSSEC
responses are the verifiers in the system1. Note that in the chapter we don’t consider the
whole recursive query process. We assume that the DNSKEYs are a robust key distribu-
tion mechanism and abstract the exchange of DNSKEY. We consider only the interaction
between the validator and the nameserver that is authoritative for the zone.
In this chapter, we attempt to formally define the security goals of DNSSEC. We repre-
sent the conventional DNSSEC-NSEC3 and another plausible “candidate” replacement for
the same using the definition, as examples. We don’t prove it’s security, because, we show
both protocols aren’t private in chapter 3. Further, we show that if a protocol achieves the
security goals of DNSSEC then we can construct a weak signature using the same.
1We borrow the notations authenticator, responder and verifier from [31].
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2.1 Candidate Definitions
2.1.1 Motivation
In the DNSSEC scenario, it is in the authenticator’s interest to ensure the client gets
correct responses, so we assume it is trusted. Thus, in our definitions of security, we will
assume the authenticator is always honest, and that the verifier receives the correct public
key from the owner. The responder, on the other hand, can be malicious, or may have
an attacker modify the information it gets from the authenticator. There may also be a
man-in-the-middle (cache poisoning) adversary that forges malicious responses. Thus, the
protocol needs to be designed so as to allow the verifier to detect incorrect answers given by
a malicious host or modified in transit by the adversary. These requirements are identical
to the problem of authenticated data structures/outsourced databases (for example, [31])
.
However, we have one more requirement: we are concerned that the verifier may also be
malicious and may try to obtain more information than intended by the protocol. Specif-
ically, we want to prevent the verifier from obtaining entries that it has not requested
(for example “zone enumeration” with NSEC). This secrecy requirement makes the prob-
lem similar to the problem of Zero-Knowledge Sets (or Zero-Knowledge Databases) [24],
which protect against malicious verifiers. However, Zero-Knowledge Sets do not distin-
guish between the authenticator and the responder (there are only two parties:prover–
authenticator+responder and verifier), so we cannot use the Zero-Knowledge definition un-
modified. In fact, our task is easier, because having a trusted authenticator (and, therefore,
an honestly generated public key) makes it easier to guarantee consistency of responses.
We will use the definition of authenticated data structures from [31] as our starting
point, and will consider different secrecy requirements in addition to it.
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2.1.2 Modeling Integrity
We model the correctness requirements of DNSSEC as an authenticated database. We use
a few notations from [31], but present a more generalised definition to fit our purposes.
For our purposes, a database D : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ ∪ {Out} is a mapping that, for an
arbitrary input string, gives either an output string, or a special indicator Out that means
that the input is not in the database. An authenticated database scheme allows the owner
of a database D to authenticate D and outsource the same to another server. This server
then responds to queries on D by other clients. Since, we require integrity guarantees of
responses , we define completeness and soundness as security properties any authenticated
database scheme must satisfy. First, we formally define an authenticated database scheme.
Definition 1. An authenticated database scheme (ADS) is a quadruple of PPT algorithms
(Gen,Auth,Res,Ver) such that:
Key Generation Algorithm Gen run by the owner takes as input a security parameter
1k, and outputs a key pair. We write (PK ,SK )← Gen(1k).
Authenticator Auth upon receiving the public key PK , the secret key SK and the
database D as input, halts after outputting a commitment/authentication string
Comm and a committed database CD. We denote the same as (Comm,CD) ←
Auth(PK ,SK , D).
Responder The responder Res on receiving the public key PK and the committed database
CD from the authenticator, as well as a query x from the client, produces a proof pix
on D(x), to be returned to the client. We denote the same by pix ← Res(CD,PK , x).
Verifier The verifier algorithm Ver receives the proof pix on x, verifies it using PK and
Comm, and outputs y = D(x) if it is valid, or y = Invalid otherwise. We denote the
same as y ← Ver(x, pix,PK ,Comm). (Note that we view pix as carrying information
D(x) in it.)
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Our definition is deliberately as general as possible, so as to allow for many options in
designing DNSSEC. In particular, the system may be easier to use if PK is simply a public
key, independent of D and reusable for multiple databases. This possibility is within the
scope of the definition, because Gen depends only on the security parameter.
Comm is a “digest” on the database (e.g., signed root of a Merkle hash tree [23]), but
the requirement of such a digest is not enforced. If the ADS doesn’t require a digest,
Comm can be assigned a special symbol ⊥. The database digest may be sent to the verifier
directly, or through the responder (in which case, according to our definition, it will be
part of every proof pix). Note that Res can be stateful, so proofs can have a reusable
precomputed component based on PK and CD, reused for multiple queries x, if that helps
efficiency.
To model correctness, an authenticated database scheme must satisfy the property of
completeness. Informally, completeness simply states that if Gen, Auth and Res function
as in the definition, then verification of the proof produced by Res would give the expected
output with overwhelming probability. More formally,
Definition 2. An authenticated database (Gen,Auth,Res,Ver) is -complete if (PK ,SK )←
Gen(1k), (Comm,CD) ← Auth(PK ,SK , D) and pix ← Res(CD,PK ) for any database D,
then
Pr[D(x)← Ver(x, pix,PK ,Comm)] ≥ 1− 
Now, that we have defined the correctness of the scheme, we need to model integrity.
Note that, for integrity we require that a verifier can detect fake responses generated
by a malicious responder or some man-in-the-middle. We capture this property formally
through a weak definition of soundness.
Definition 3. For a given database D, the authenticated database (Gen,Auth,Res,Ver) is
(τ, )- sound, if every adversary Res with running time at most τ , has probability at most
 in winning the following game:
• (PK ,SK )← Gen(1k)
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• (Comm,CD)← Auth(PK ,SK , D)
• (x, pix)← Res(Comm,CD,PK )
where Res wins if y ← Ver(x, pix,Comm,PK ) such that y 6= Invalid and y 6= D(x), i.e., the
proof pix on x is not consistent with the database mapping, but is yet valid.
The ADS is then considered sound if for every τ ≈ poly(k), there exists an  ≈ negl(k),
such that ADS is (τ, )-sound.
Note the definition of soundness assumes that the verifier receives the correct PK and
correct commitment Comm; no guarantees are provided if that is not the case. There
can be a variety of mechanisms (most likely, using certification and digital signatures)
for ensuring this property, but they are independent of the security of the authenticated
database scheme itself. If there arises a scenario where the “digest” generated using Auth is
subject to modification by some Res, the “digest” can be added as a re-usable component
of pix and Comm be set to ⊥.
Man-in-the-middle adversaries are weaker adversaries than the ones modeled in defini-
tion 3. For such adversaries, we can follow the same game as above, with the difference
that, a man-in-the-middle doesn’t receive CD as input.
2.1.3 Modeling Privacy
Now, that we have defined an ADS, we would like to define potential privacy goals for
ADS. Some of the candidate definitions follow.
Firstly, the most natural definition of privacy is that of zero-knowledge. For the same,
we make use of the definition zero-knowledge from [10].
Definition 4. Zero-knowledge. There exists a simulator Sim = (Sim1, Sim2,Sim3) such
that for probabilistic polynomial-time malicious verifiers Ver = (Ver1,Ver2), the absolute
value of the difference
Pr[(PK ,SK )← Gen(1k) ; (D, stateV )← Ver1(1k,PK ) ;
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(Comm,CD)← Auth(PK ,SK , D) s.t. VerRes(CD,PK ,·)2 (stateV ) = 1]−
Pr[(PK , stateσ)← Sim1(1k) ; (D, stateV )← Ver1(1k,PK ) ;
(Comm, stateS)← Sim2(1k,PK , stateσ) s.t. VerSim3(stateS ,·,D(·))2 (stateV ) = 1]
is negligible in k. (Immediately above, the notation Ver
Sim3(stateS ,·,D(·))
1 means that the
adversary gets to choose x and will receive the result of Sim3(stateS , x,D(x)) — i.e., the
two · symbols refer to the same value).
Zero-knowledge is a useful property, but it may be too strong as a requirement. Instead,
a weaker definition of semantic security could be used. Informally, semantic security is
the property that the adversary doesn’t learn any more about some new message x′ from
existing proofs pix1 , pix2 . . ., than any other PPT adversary does from knowing only the pairs
(x1, D(x1)), (x2, D(x2)) . . . The formal definition uses the semantic security of public-key
encryption from [14] as a starting point.
Definition 5. The ADS is said to be -semantically secure for a database D (where D′
is a part of the database that is public knowledge) if, for every PPT adversary A, there
exists a PPT adversary A′, such that
Pr[f(x,D(x))← A(PK , D′,Comm $← Auth(PK ,SK , D), Info = {(x1, pix1), . . . (xn, pixn)})
s.t. (x,D(x)) 6∈ Info & x ∈Mx(D)] ≤
Pr[f(x,D(x))← A′(PK , D′, Info′ = {(x1, D(x1)), (x2, D(x2)), . . . (xn, D(xn))})
s.t. (x,D(x)) 6∈ Info′ & x ∈Mx(D)] + 
where (PK ,SK ) ← Gen(1k) and Mx(D) ⊆ DS is some space where (x,Out) occurs with
probability at most p ≈ 1poly(k) for every x ∈Mx(D), for all polynomially bounded functions
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. The advantage of the adversary A, i.e., AdvSSA (1k, D) = .
The restriction in place is required, because a prediction adversary would otherwise
select a random x from {0, 1}∗ and guess Out . The probability of success in that case
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approaches 1, since the database itself is polynomial sized, and negligible in size compared
to the domain {0, 1}∗. But obviously, such a randomly constructed string is of no practical
significance to the scheme.
Note that, we can allow the adversaries to construct the sets Info and Info′ adaptively
by providing them oracle access to Res and the database D respectively.
For the semantic security for PKE in [14], the definition explicitly allows the adversary
access to auxiliary information about the messages (e.g., the distribution of messages). We
have avoided explicitly mentioning the same only for notational convenience, but we allow
the adversary the knowledge to a public component of D.
2.2 The DNSSEC standard and NSEC3
First, we present a simplified version of the DNSSEC (including NSEC3) using the def-
inition of the DNSSEC/ADS model presented above. The scheme doesn’t describe the
authentication or for that matter take into account DNSKEY distribution at all!
Parameters (1k) For a security parameter k, the underlying signature algorithm sign (for
e.g., RSA, EC-DSA) and the hash-algorithm hash (for e.g., SHA-256, SHA-512) are
selected. For the sake of analysis we consider hash to be a random oracle.
Gen (1k) The Gen (1k) runs the key-generation algorithm of one of the signature schemes
used (for e.g., the RSA signature key generation algorithm). Let the output be
(PK ,SK ). The same is authenticated using the authentication chain.
Auth (PK ,SK , D) For the set of records D that the owner maintains, the algorithm does
the following :
For each record R, having domain name u, compute hu = hash(u) and signature
σu = sign(u,D(u)) and store in CD (along with u and D(u), where D(u) is the
corresponding information from the zone).
CD is sorted according to the values hu. Now, for every record, store also the value
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hu′ of the previous record in the list in CD. Also, a signature σu,u′ on (hu, hu′) is
stored with the record. Henceforth, we call this part of the record ,i.e., the tuple
(hu, hu′ , σu,u′), as the NSEC3 record for this tuple.
2 Thus Auth outputs CD as the
trapdoor. There is no Comm output here.
Res (CD,PK , x) For the query on some x, Res computes hx = hash(x) and searches CD for
hx. If x exists in CD, then, Res assigns pix = (x,D(x), σx). If x 6∈ CD, then, it finds
the smallest value hu ∈ CD such that hu > hx and assigns to pix the corresponding
NSEC3 record.
Res returns pix.
Ver (PK , x, pix) Ver runs the verification procedure corresponding to sign. Additionally, if
pix is a NSEC3 record, then it verifies if hu′ < hu∗ < hu. If valid, then Ver returns
D(x) (if returned) or Out(if NSEC3). Otherwise, Ver returns Invalid .
While do not provide concrete security proofs for completeness and soundness, an in-
tuition for why the above scheme is both complete and sound are :
Completeness Completeness comes from the fact that the hash function hashis a well-
defined function and the correctness of the signature. If indeed the verifier rejects
the signature, either the signature was on a value different for the one the verifier is
using or the signing the algorithm is faulty. If Res and Ver used different values it
means the hash(x) computed by both doesn’t match.
Soundness The soundness follows from the unforgeability of the signature scheme and the
collision resistance of the hash function. If for some x 6∈ D, suppose the malicious
responder Res outputs a postive record with signature on hy (where y ∈ D), then Res
has found a collision since hash(x) = hash(y). If we don’t have a collision then hx is
a fresh message. Therefore, we have a forgery! Similarly, if Res generates an NSEC3
response for x ∈ D, again, we will have a forgery.
2The NSEC3 records actually use a salt. This paper [8] says that the use of salt in NSEC3 is ineffectual.
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2.3 Pruned Merkle Tree – Hybrid Scheme
We only briefly described the hybrid scheme here. The scheme is a plausible restriction
of the scheme for zero-knowledge databases in [10], to allow only offline computations,
i.e., proofs are just traversals on the precomputed Merkle Tree. Unlike in their protocol,
we restrict the size of negative proofs (that are not in the Merkle Path) to only size
d. Their scheme uses Mercurial Commitments, but we shall use the usual commitment
schemes (Commit,Open,VerOpen) 3, as the malleability provided by soft-commitments
isn’t required for us. Commitment schemes achieve the property of binding and hiding.
We do not provide formal definitions and refer readers to [24] for the same.
Another difference is that our scheme is ordered on the outputs of a random oracle,
rather than on the actual inputs x. We do this to bring in some amount of unpredictability,
i.e., if we query on x, it is trivial to query on it’s neighbour x′ where the last bit of x is
flipped. But if we order by the output of random oracle,then for our query on x, with
rx = RO(x), querying the neighbour of x, i.e., the value y for which the RO(y) = r′x,
where r′x is rx with its last bit flipped, is infeasible. We can succeed in querying the
neighbour with probability 1
2k
, where k = |rx|.
Let us assume that the hybrid scheme uses a random oracle RO with output length of
k bits. Let PKC be some public key of the commitment scheme and SK sign and PK sign
the signing and verification key of the authenticator Auth. Therefore, the authenticator’s
public key is PK = (PKC ,PK sign). Let D be the database (that the hybrid scheme aims
to protect) of size m, containing pairs (x, y) indexed on x.The scheme returns proofs of
size d for authenticated denial of existence (security level). Here, d is small enough, that
2d computations is feasible and preferably practical. The scheme (paraphrased from [10]
along with the aforementioned changes) briefly entails the following steps:
Commitment The commitment to the database is the commitment at the root of an
“incomplete” Merkle Tree. For all pairs (x, vx) in the database, query RO on x to
3The definition of commitments in [24] don’t have the protocol Open, but they infact merge Commitand
Open. We split the same for consistency with notation from Mercurial Commitments in [10]
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receive rx ← RO(x). Compute cx = Commit(PKC , rx, v). If the neighbour of x (by
the random oracle ordering) is not in the database, then cy = Commit(PKC , r
′
x,⊥)
where ⊥ is a special symbol signifying that the query isn’t in the database. For all
other leafs x, cx = nil. We now build a tree in bottom-up fashion from these defined
leaves, where at every level i from k−1 to 0, for each string σ of length i, we compute
cσ as follows:
1. If cσ1 6= nil and cσ0 6= nil then cσ = Commit(PKC , σ, (cσ1, cσ0)).
2. Else if either i ≤ d or cσ′ 6= nil where σ′ is σ with it’s last bit flipped , then
cσ = Commit(PKC , σ,⊥).
3. Else cσ = nil.
The commitment at the root is c∅. If the database is empty, then the root has
c∅ = Commit(PKC , ∅,⊥). Auth outputs the Merkle tree and the database D as the
committed database CD.But we overload the use of CD here to refer only to the
Merkle tree, and we refer to D separately. It outputs sign(c∅) as Comm.
Query Responses The responder Res now has CD, D and Comm with it. To answer a
query x which is in the database, we use the same method as in [10]. We elaborate the
same verbatim from [10]. Let rx|i be the first i bits of rx, and (rx|i)′ be the first i− 1
bits of rx followed by the i-th bit flipped. Let $x = Open(PKC , D(x), rx, cx) and
$rx|i = Open(PKC , (crx|i0, crx|i1), rx|i, crx|i) for 0 ≤ i < k. Return D(x) together
with crx|i , c(rx|i)′ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and pirx|i for 0 ≤ i ≤ k. In other words, Res returns
Comm, D(x) together with the proof pix being its authenticating path to the root,
which consists of ancestors of x, their siblings, and proofs that each parent is the
commitment to the two children.
Suppose, x is not in the database. We repeat the same process as above, but only
for levels 0 ≤ i ≤ t, where level t is the one where $rx|t = Open(PKC ,⊥, rx|t, crx|t).
Return Comm, D(x) together with crx|i , c(rx|i)′ for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and $rx|i for 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
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The proof pix here is the authenticating path, but only till level l. Note, that t ≥ d.
Verification For verification Ver first verifies the commitment is indeed from Auth by
Versign (PK sign, Comm). Then it runs VerOpen on all the returned proofs (Merkle
tree path verification). If at least one of the proofs doesn’t verify, it outputs Invalid .
If one of the proofs opened to ⊥, then it accepts that x isn’t in the database, else, if
there are k proofs and the final proof on rx opens to v, it accepts that D(x) = v.
Again, we do not provide formal arguments for the completeness and soundness of this
protocol. The two must follow from the completeness and soundness of the corresponsing
zero-knowledge protocol in [10]. An intuitive argument for the same does follow.
Completeness Completeness of the hybrid scheme follows from the completeness of the
underlying commitment scheme used, the correctness of the signature, key distribu-
tion and the consistency in the output of the random oracle. Suppose a pix generated
by Res isn’t validated by Ver, then either both have differing copies of rx or PK . If
the signature validations doesn’t fail, then one node in the authentication path fails
verification going against completeness of the underlying commitment scheme.
Soundness Soundness of the hybrid scheme follows from the binding of the commitment
scheme and the existential unforgeability of the signature. Res cannot generate its
own Merkle tree, because it will then have to output the right Comm, thus forging
a signature for the public key PK . If it uses the same Merkle root, then one of the
internal nodes commits to at least two differing values, thus breaking the binding
property of the commitment scheme.
2.4 Signatures from DNSSEC
In this section, we investigate the possibility of construction of secure signatures using a
secure DNSSEC scheme. We reduce the unforgeability of the signature to the soundness
and the semantic security of the ADS.
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2.4.1 Signature Definitions
For our purposes we require a restricted version of existential unforgeability. This property
is defined formally.
Definition 6. A signature scheme (Gensign,Signsign,Versign) has restricted existential un-
forgeability under chosen message attacks if every PPT forger FS has a success probability
that is negligible in the security parameter, in the following game:
1. FS receives the public key PK sign and other public parameters (obtained by running
Setup and Gensign for security parameter k). Also, it receives a target message space
Mx.
2. FS is allowed to make at most some poly(k) queries to the signing oracle S.
3. FS wins the game if it outputs a valid forgery σx ( i.e., Valid← Versign (PK sign,σx, x))
on some x ∈Mx such that it had not queried on x to the signing oracle S.
This definition doesn’t specify the extent of restriction. The extent of restriction is
decided by the size of Mx. In case of an exponentially large (in k) Mx, the forger should
be given a polynomial sized description of the entire space (for e.g., the basis of a linear
space).
2.4.2 Construction
The construction of a signature scheme (Setup,Gensign,Signsign,Versign) using a secure ADS
(Gen,Auth,Res,Ver) is as follows:
Setup(1k) Given the security parameter, selects a (known/public) database D′ of size n′ ≈
poly(k).
Gensign(1
k, D′) Given the security parameter as input the key generation process proceeds
in the following manner.
• (PK ,SK )← Gen(1k)
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• Select M ⊂ DS× {0, 1}∗ be a random space of pairs (x, y) where y 6= Out , s.t.
|M| ≈ poly(k). Let Mx be the space consisting of all the x values in M.
• D is the database obtained by appending to D′ pairs from M, such that every
pair in M is included with probability 12 .
• (Comm,CD)← Auth(PK ,SK , D)
The signing key is SK sign = CD and the verification key is PK sign = (PK ,Comm).
Signsign (SK sign,PK sign,m) The signature σm is extracted by running Res, i.e., pim ←
Res(CD,PK ,m). The signature σm = pim.
Versign (PK sign,m, σm) The signature verification algorithm parses PK sign to obtain PK and
Comm. Then, it runs the verification algorithm Ver to validate the signature, i.e.,
y ← Ver(m,σm,PK ,Comm). Output Invalid if y = Invalid , Valid otherwise.
2.4.3 Security Proof
In our construction, to forge the signature on some message x the forger would require to
guess the existence of the message in D (and possibly the appropriate value D(x)). Thus,
during a forgery, we expect to encounter one of the two cases:
1. For the message x, FS can produce a forgery by predicting incorrectly the value of
D(x), i.e., for an arbitrary pair (x, y) where y 6= D(x) .
2. For the message x, FS can produce a forgery by correctly predicting the value of
D(x).
Firstly, we would like to show that no PPT forger FS1 on the targetMx (as per definition
6) can produce a forgery by “lying”, i.e., forging in case 1 is infeasible. We show that if
the forger wins in the first case, then we can use such a forger to break the soundness of
the underlying ADS.
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Lemma 2.4.1. If there exists a forger FS1 (PK sign, D′, {0, 1}∗) running in time τ , that can
forge using some pair (x, y) where y 6= D(x) with non-negligible probability , then there
exists an adversarial host, Res running in time τ that breaks the soundness property of
ADS with probability .
Proof. Res on receiving (Comm,CD,PK ) as input, uses the forger FS1 to break soundness
in the following manner.
• Res selects a random subset D′ ⊂ D and sets target space as {0, 1}∗ .
• Res sets PK sign = (PK ,Comm) and runs FS1 with input (PK sign,D′, {0, 1}∗).
• Res simulates the signing oracle S’s response to a query on some xi by FS1 , by running
Res (Comm,CD,PK ) and returning its output pixi as the signature σxi . The query
and response are stored as state information.
• On receiving the forgery σ on some message x from FS1 , Res computes y ← Ver(x, σ,
Comm,PK ). If y = Invalid or y = D(x) or x is an earlier query to the signing oracle,
it aborts citing failure, else, it returns (x, y) and terminates.
Since, we assume in this lemma FS1 produces a forgery using a pair (x, y), where y 6= D(x),
Res wins the soundness game whenever the forger wins the game. Therefore, it can win
the soundness game with probability . It is seen that the running time is τ .
Now that we have reduced the possibility of a “lying” forger to soundness, we show
a reduction of a weaker forger FS2 to semantic security. The forger is restricted in the
sense that, it must output a forgery on some x ∈ Mx for which it hasn’t already queried
the signing oracle. It is seen that with access to only D as an oracle, even with the best
prediction adversary (on Mx) A′ wins with probability at most 12 .
Theorem 2.4.2. Suppose, there exists a PPT forger FS2 running in time τ , that forges
successfully on some value x inMx with probability , then, there exists an adaptive privacy
adversary A against the ADS (with soundness guarantee) s.t. AdvSSA (1k, D) ≈ .
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Proof. The adaptive (stateful) privacy adversary ARes(PK , D′,Comm, ·) with oracle access
to Res, uses FS2 to output some (x,D(x)) such that x ∈ Mx. ARes is constructed in the
following manner.
1. A runs FS2 on the input (D′,PK sign,Mx), where PK sign = (PK ,Comm).
2. To respond (by simulating the signing oracle S) to a query on any message xi by FS2 ,
A queries the same xi to Res and returns the received proof pixi as the signature σxi .
It stores all the queries and the responses as state information.
3. Suppose, FS2 outputs a forgery (x, σx) where x was never queried to the signing oracle.
If x ∈Mx and y ← Ver(x, σx,PK ,Comm) where y 6= Invalid , then A outputs (m, y)
and terminates. Otherwise, if y = Invalid , A outputs (x,Out), else, A selects a
x′ ∈Mx which hasn’t queried to Res earlier, and outputs (x′,Out) and terminates.
It can be seen that A runs in time τ , i.e., the time taken by FS2 . Also, A succeeds whenever
FS2 succeeds, except if FS2 lied about the value of y. We see from lemma 2.4.1 that if FS2
succeeds with y 6= D(x), then we can break the soundness of the ADS. Since, the ADS
comes with soundness guarantees, we assume, this happens with a probability negligible in
k, i.e., negl(k). When FS2 fails, then A wins with probability 12 , given the construction of
D. Therefore, AdvSSA (1k) ≤ − negl(k) ≈ .
2.4.4 Offline?
We were able to achieve successful reduction to signatures with very weak unforgeability
guarantees. But the above reduction isn’t helpful to claim that secure offline-only ADS is
impossible. The reason is that existence of offline signatures with aforementioned guaran-
tees isn’t surprising. One could pre-compute strong signatures on the all x ∈ Mx and for
all x 6∈ Mx simply return x itself.
The reason we cannot reduce to conventional EF-CMA signatures, is that ADS doesn’t
hide the non-existence of arbitrary domains. It is in-fact impossible to hide the non-
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existence of arbitrary domains in the database. This is so because the size of the database
as compared to the size of the domain space DS is negligibly small.
Chapter 3
Defining Zone Enumeration
In the previous section, we saw how a conventional notion of security couldn’t capture
our desired impossibility result. We now shift our approach. Instead of proving through
reductions, we would like to show theoretical zone-enumeration attacks on all plausible
ADS mechanisms that adhere to DNSSEC’s operational constraints.
In DNSSEC, privacy is concerned with learning all/most elements within a zone, not
learning elements that are not in the zone. We present two styles of adversaries Oblivious
and Adaptive (rather notions of “insecurity”) to capture this scenario. Further, we show
these attacks in the known scenario of NSEC3 and the example hybrid proof system.
3.1 Defining Privacy
We look at defining privacy, rather, the lack of privacy, through some attacks. The attacks
defined here assume that attackers (at some point in time) get a dictionary Dict of size n.
The attackers are given oracle access to Res (CD,PK ,x) for some database D of size m.
We currently work with the restriction that D ⊂ Dict. An adversary is then expected to
“prune” Dict, with minimum number of queries to Res, to better predict the database D.
We make no assumptions on the computational capabilities of the attackers, except that
it is bound to some polynomial in the size of the database. We only attempt to minimize
the number of queries made to Res.
Note that we make a very strong assumption on the nature of the dictionary. We can
avoid such a requirement. But, then the adversary is expected to predict only D
⋂
Dict.
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Now, with the scenario established, the attacks are defined below. The distinction
between the two attacks is on the use of the dictionary in querying Res. Also, the definition
will concretely establish what is expected of a “pruned” dictionary.
Oblivious Attack An (δ, ε, n,m)-oblivious attacker (having Dict as input and oracle ac-
cess to Res) has two algorithms.
LearnerRes(δ, ε, n)→ stateL The learner is allowed to query Res multiple times, before
it outputs some state, stateL. The learner essentially learns the function Res.
The state, stateL can be thought of as a description of the learned function. Note
that the learner is given the size of the dictionary n and success parameters ε
and δ, but is not given the size of the database m and doesn’t have access to
the dictionary.
Prune(δ, ε,Dict, stateL)→ pDict The pruning adversary gets the learned algorithm
through stateL. The pruning algorithm prunes the dictionary to output pDict.
Again, the pruning algorithm isn’t given the size of the database m and oracle
access to Res.
The oblivious attacker produces pDict as its output. An oblivious attacker is a
(δ, ε, n,m)-oblivious attacker, if it outputs some pDict, such that
Pr[x
R← pDict : x ∈ D] ≥ ε
with probability ≥ δ over all the choices of D of size m and Dict of size n (where
D ⊆ Dict) .
Adaptive Attack An adaptive attacker is given a dictionary Dict and access to Res. An
adaptive attacker outputs a pruned dictionary pDict. The adaptive attacker is a
(δ, ε, n,m)-Adaptive attacker, if it outputs some pDict using o
(
n
)
queries to Res,
such that
Pr[x
R← pDict ∧ x ∈ D] ≥ ε
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with probability ≥ δ over all the choices of D of size m and Dict of size n (where
D ⊆ Dict) .
The adaptive attacker unlike the oblivious attacker is allowed to query Res using the
dictionary. Note that if we allow O
(
n
)
queries, then all schemes are vulnerable to an
adaptive attack. An adaptive attacker will simply exhaust the dictionary by querying the
same to Res.
In our definitions, the adversary considers all elements in the dictionary are equally
likely to be in the database. In other words, the adversary doesn’t have additional auxiliary
information in its possession. Furthermore, in the oblivious attack we make an additional
generalisation. The distribution of proofs on elements in the dictionary that are not in the
database must approximate the distribution of proofs on elements in the whole domain
space DS. This is expected from any reasonable protocol. To elaborate, for any reasonably
selected dictionary Dict, the distribution of proofs on the remaining n − m elements in
Dict must approximate the distribution of proofs over the entire domain space DS. If
this weren’t the case, it would imply that a biased dictionary would be easy to construct,
that would imply that the proofs are trivially predictable. Such a protocol is trivially not
private. The above restriction is realised if the proofs are computed on hash(x) instead of
x itself.
The above definitions are loosely based on PAC learners with membership queries [33].
Note : Feasibility of Oblivious Attacks - Following this section, we try to construct
only oblivious adversaries. Clearly oblivious adversaries are stronger than their adaptive
counter parts as they have to learn the proofs without access to the dictionary. Further,
they may also be more practical. In a typical practical scenario, an oblivious attack can
be mounted against a server at any given time, by simply anticipating that we will get a
reasonable dictionary at some point in the future. Once, we get a dictionary, we can learn
the elements in the database at the time of attack, i.e., it is resilient to updates in the
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database. In case of a rate-limiting server, we need not flood the server with such queries.
We can spread the queries evenly over the period where we are certain that the zone isn’t
updated and the keys aren’t rolled over. The learner could also sample already queried
packets from the wild, instead of actually querying Res itself.
3.2 Oblivious Attacks
We shall now describe oblivious attacks on certain example Res functions. The first Res
function is the NSEC3 and the next is an example construction from a pruned-offline
version of a merkle-tree based construction of zero-knowledge databases.
3.2.1 NSEC3
In the following oblivious attack on NSEC3, we consider that the security parameter κ is
some adversarial estimate of the size of zone/database. For details on NSEC3 we refer the
reader to section 2.2.
Our attack on NSEC3 works under the assumption that the scheme uses a random oracle
instead of a conventional cryptographic hash function. This assumption helps simplify the
probability analysis.
Prior to proceeding, note that NSEC3 uses adjacent random oracle outputs (h1, h2) as
a proof bucket. We would like to bound the bucket sizes. As a first step we make use of
the result of finding near birthdays from [4]. The bound for the same follows. It is written
verbatim from [11, Section 2.3] (with minor change in notations), but as a lemma here:
Lemma 3.2.1. Let p(κ,m, t) denote the probability that in a group of m people, no pair1
with birthdays within t days of each others exists, if there are κ equally likely birthdays,
then
p(κ,m, t) =
(κ−mt− 1)!
κm−1(κ−m(t+ 1))!
1The statement in [11] has a typo. It gives the above inequality saying at least one pair exists, but it is
actually the case that no pair exists.
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Thus, in our case the likely number of birthdays is the range of the random oracle (of
size 2k, say). Therefore, κ = 2k. Also, the number of people will be the number of elements
in the database, i.e., m. We need to identify t in this case. We could set p(κ,m, t) = 
according to some adversarial confidence requirement (i.e., with confidence 1 −  we can
estimate the size of t). We can estimate t from 2k, m and  then. But there is a caveat!
The above birthday problems the distance k is cyclical, i.e., birthday at the end of the year
and a birthday at the start of the next year should also be t calendar days apart. We do
not require the same in our case. Thus, we simplify the proofs to neglect the wraparounds
in [4] to identify the right probability.
Lemma 3.2.2. If p′(κ,m, t) is the probability that in a group of m people, no pair have a
birthday within t days of each other, in the same year, for a year with κ days, then
p′(κ,m, t) =
(κ− (m− 1)(t− 1))!
κm(κ− (t− 1)(m− 1)−m)!
Proof. Following the lines of proof from [4] : Consider the set of all possible sequences
1 ≤ x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xm ≤ κ, such that t ≤ |xi+1 − xi| for i ≤ m− 1. Then, our required event
consists of all possible permutations (m!) of each of such sequences (since, the numbers
are chosen uniformly at random and we are interested only in the distance between the
adjacent pairs in sorted order of these sequence of numbers).
For every such sequence 1 ≤ x1 ≤ . . . ≤ xm ≤ κ, such that t ≤ |xi+1−xi| for i ≤ m−1,
there exists a sequence 1 ≤ y1 ≤ . . . ≤ ym ≤ κ−(m−1)(t−1), where yi = xi−(i−1)(t−1)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Therefore, we now have a sequence where yi+1 − yi ≥ 1. Therefore, the
total such choices of y’s are
(
κ−(m−1)(t−1)
m
)
.
Hence, total possible sequences are m!
(
κ−(m−1)(t−1)
m
)
. Thus,
p′(κ,m, t) =
m!
κm
(
κ− (m− 1)(t− 1)
m
)
=
(κ− (m− 1)(t− 1))!
κm(κ− (m− 1)(t− 1)−m)!
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Note that for n > m, it is imminent that p′(κ, n, t) < p′(κ,m, t). Now, we can use
lemma 3.2.2, to estimate t, given n (the size of Dict, with the knowledge that n > m ),
estimated confidence interval , and κ = 2k. We see that
 =
(2k − (n− 1)(t− 1))!
2nk(2k − (n− 1)(t− 1)− n)!
>
(2k − (n− 1)(t− 1)− (n− 1))n
2nk
= (1− (n− 1)t
2k
)n
1/n > (1− (n− 1)t
2k
)
Therefore,
t >
(1− 1/n)2k
(n− 1)
Similarly,
 <
(2k − (n− 1)(t− 1))n
2nk
1/n < (1− (n− 1)(t− 1)
2k
)
Giving us,
t <
(1− 1/n)2k
(n− 1) + 1
Therefore, for simplicity, we consider t ≈ (1−1/n)2k(n−1) . This implies that NSEC3 leaves
buckets of size at least t, with probability at least  (note that the above calculations
were based on the size of Dict and not the database and the database must in fact be
smaller).The probability that an element falls in such a bucket is
(1−1/n)2k
(n−1)
2k
= (1−
1/n)
(n−1) .
Armed, with the above bounds, we shall now present an attack on zone-enumeration.
Here we present a learner that takes as input  and n, and not (δ, ε, n). We shall later
compute δ and ε from these two values.
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LearnerRes(, n) The learner in this case outputs CD as its stateL. It works as follows:
1. Initially, CD is empty.
2. Generate xnew
R← DS such that its proof isn’t in CD. In other words, CD
shouldn’t contain the NSEC3 pair (h1, h2), such that RO(xnew) ∈ [h1, h2]. If the
learner cannot find such an xnew in
n2
(1−1/n) trials, it returns CD and terminates.
3. Query Res on xnew to receive proof pinew.
4. If pinew is valid, add to CD. Go to step 2.
Prune(Dict,CD) For every element y in Dict, Prune does the following:
1. Compute hy := RO(y).
2. In CD if there exists some Hi = (h1i, h2i) where hy = h1i and some Hj =
(h1j , h2j) where hy = h2j , then add y to pDict.
3. If CD doesn’t contain any pair Hi = (h1i, h2i) such that hy ∈ [h1i, h2i], then
add y to pDict.
We shall now describe the correctness and efficiency of the above attack.
Theorem 3.2.3. Given the confidence factor , the described oblivious adversary is a
(δ, ε, n,m) -oblivious attacker, making at most m queries to Res in the learning phase, over
all choices of databases D of size m and Dict of size n, such that D ⊆ Dict, δ ≈ 1−(men +m
2
2k
)
and ε ≈ m
n(1−1/n)+m1/n .
Proof. Firstly, for correctness, the pruner requires to get all possible buckets of size t.
We prove that the above learner doesn’t learn a NSEC3 bucket of size t with negligible
probability. Note that the probability that the bucket is not learned is at most p =(
1− (1−1/n)(n−1)
)n2/(1−1/n)
, i.e., the probability of terminating without being able to retrieve
the said bucket. We see that p <
(
1− (1−1/n)(n−1)
)(n−1)n/(1−1/n)
, viz. p < 1e
n
. Therefore,
since there are at most m such t sized buckets, the total probability of failure 1− δ < men .
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Therefore, δ ≈ 1 − men + m
2
2k
) (since δ by itself is a lower-bound, we do away with the
inequality).
Next, we show that the learner makes at most m queries to learn these buckets. By
construction, the learner makes a new query only when it generates xnew. In other words,
every query adds a new bucket to CD, unless the query collides with a random oracle value.
Both of the above happen with probability ≈ m2
2k
. Therefore, δ ≥ 1 − men + m
2
2k
. Also, the
number of queries made is exactly |CD|, which is ≤ |CD| ≈ m. Therefore, the learner makes
at most m queries to Res.
Given CD is sufficient for the pruner to enumerate all elements in the database. Let
us consider some x ∈ D. If the proof is already in CD, then we are done. Else, if RO(x)
is among the boundaries of x ∈ D, again by construction we are done. Else, the bucket
for which the same occurs as a boundary, has size much less than t.By construction, any
element in these said smaller buckets are already included in pDict. Therefore, all m
elements from D will be included in pDict.
All additional elements in pDictmust be from these smaller buckets. Note that CDmust
contain at least 1 bucket of size greater than t (sincem << 2k). Therefore, there are at most
(m− 1) buckets of size less than t. Therefore the fraction of the dictionary that lies in this
segment is thus, at most (n−m)(m−1)(1−
1/n)
n−1 < (n−m)(1− 1/n). Therefore, the expected
size of the pruned dictionary |pDict| < m+ (n−m)(1− 1/n) = n(1− 1/n) +m1/n. Thus,
ε ≈ m
n(1−1/n)+m1/n (since ε is a lower bound, we did away with the ’>’ inequality).
3.2.2 Hybrid Scheme
The idea here is that we aren’t breaking the cryptographic structure of the scheme, but
presenting an Oblivious attacker whose Learner exploits the combinatorial properties of
the “restricted Merkle tree”. The scheme is presented in 2.3 and is a plausible approach
to delegate all computations in [10] offline.
We define a bucket to be the set of 2k−d leaves starting from values rl to ru. The i-th
bucket has rl = i2
k−d and ru = (i+ 1)2k−d − 1. Hence, the bucket i is the set of all leaves
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under the i-th path in the tree of length d.
Let D be the database (that the hybrid scheme aims to protect) of size m, containing
pairs (x, y) indexed on x.The scheme returns proofs of size d for authenticated denial of
existence (security level). Here, d is small enough, that 2d computations is feasible and
preferably practical.
Let n be the size of the dictionary that the adversary may obtain sometime in the future.
Let d′ be the “confidence level” that the adversaries aim to achieve on each positive proof
bucket that it retrieves. Let c be a constant, denoting the maximum number of database
elements that can lie within a bucket.
Learner The learner of the oblivious attacker LearnerRes maintains the set of retrieved
proofs Π. We overload the ∈ operator here. For example, we use it both in the
sense of pi ∈ Π for a proof pi and rx ∈ Π to denote that the set holds a proof for the
value rx := RO(x). LearnerRes maintains a set Yes Instance where he stores the set
of proofs of length d′ or greater such that one of its leaf nodes is a database element.
LearnerRes begins by running the procedure Find Buckets.
Procedure Find Buckets
1. If Π has 2d distinct elements, terminate. Else, pick at random some message
x
R← DS and rx = RO(x) such that rx 6∈ Π.
2. A query on x returns a proof pix. If the length of the proof is d, then add pix to
Π and go to step 1.
3. Given a proof pix of length greater than d. Let rx = RO(x) lie in the bucket
[rl, ru]. Firstly, we store pi
′
x in Π, where pi
′
x is the first d elements in the proof.
Then, we call Interesting Region(rl, ru, (x, pix)). Go to step 1.
To elaborate on step 3, let the authenticating path have proofs $rx|i for 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
Note that since, $rx|t opens to (PKC ,⊥, rx|t, crx|t), by our construction, c(rx|t)′ 6= nil,
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where (rx|t)′ is rx|t with the last bit swapped. Therefore, according to the construc-
tion (rx|t)′ is an internal node on an authenticating path to some element in the
database. Therefore, the 2k−d bucket covering values from rl to ru is a bucket of
interest.
Procedure Interesting Region(rl,ru, (x, pix))
Let pix signify the proof region covered by the sibling of the last node of proof in pix.
1. If the length of pix is greater than d
′, then let [rlx, rux] be the region of leaves
covered under the subtree represented by pix. Store [rld′ , rud′ ] in Yes Instance
and jump to step 4.
2. Select a random x′ R← DS with rx′ := RO(x′) such that, rx′ ∈ pix.
3. Query on x′ to obtain pix′ . Let the length of pix′ be dx′ . If dx′ is greater than d′,
store pix′ in the set Yes Instance and go to step 4. Otherwise, set pix = pix′ and
go to step 2.
4. Now consider pix|−1, i.e., the proof region covered by the sibling of the node
above the last one in pix. Now, search this region (the leaves under this subtree)
again for longer proofs (indicating a smaller region containing another element
in the database) i.e., if a randomly drawn element has proof size greater than
dx′−1, then search for a proof of size larger than d′ and add the region [rlx′ , rux′ ]
covered by its sibling to Yes Instance.
5. Repeat step 4 by iteratively reducing the target proof size, i.e., pix|−2 and so
on until the required proof size is down to d + 1 (or until the space ru to rl is
exhausted).
The procedure Interesting Region is in essence a depth-first search (DFS) through the
subtree in the “interesting region” to find all regions of size ≤ 2k−d′ elements which
contain elements in the database.
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The learner outputs Yes Instance as its state, stateL.
Pruner For every element x in the Dict with rx = RO(x), if rx falls in a region [rlx, rux],
where [rlx, rux] ∈ Yes Instance, then add x to pDict.
We shall now proceed to analyse the efficiency and the efficacy of the above oblivious
attack. Now suppose an interesting region has c elements in the database. Since, we are
using a random oracle, we can conjecture that the output of the random oracles corre-
sponding to the above c elements must be evenly distributed between rl and ru too. We
work with this assumption for the sake of a simple analysis. Therefore, the proofs in this
interesting region are of length at least d + blog cc. Using this as a fact, we prove the
following lemma.
Note: We don’t need to pre-determine c. The constant is simply useful in the analysis.
In effect we just require a DFS like search down the interesting region.
Lemma 3.2.4. The expected number of queries to generate a new element for the Yes Instance
is 1 + (d′ − (d+ blog cc))/2.
Proof. We define X0 as the random variable signifying the number of queries made to
generate a new element of the Yes Instance given the prefix of length d+ blog cc. Let X1 be
the random variable signifying the number of queries made to generate a new element of the
Yes Instance given a proof of length d+ blog cc+ 1. We can define X2, X3 . . .Xd′−(d+blog cc)
analogously. Note that, we are required to determine E[X0]. The above set of random
variables forms a Markov Chain, the transition matrix of which is:
P =

d0 d1 d2 ... dd′−(d+blog cc)
d0 0 12
1
22
. . . 1
2d
′−(d+blog cc)−1
d1 0 0 12 . . .
1
2d
′−(d+blog cc)−2
...
. . .
dd′−(d+blog cc)−1 0 0 0 . . . 1
dd′−(d+blog cc) 0 0 0 . . . 1

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Let pij denote the probability of transition from state di to dj . Here di is the state with
proofs of length d+ blog cc+ i.
Therefore, E[Xi] = 1+
d′−(d+blog cc)∑
j=1
pijE[Xj ] (where pij =
1
2j−i ), with E[Xd′−(d+blog cc)] =
0. We are required to find E[X0] = 1+
d′−d+blog cc∑
j=1
p0jE[Xj ] = 1+
d′−(d+blog cc)−1∑
j=1
1
2j
E[Xj ]. On
further unraveling the recursion (telescopic sum) we have E[X0] = 1+(d−(d′+bcc))/2.
Armed with the above lemma, we are now ready to bound the number of queries that
the above oblivious attacker asks. Here we take ε as the expected ratio of the number of
elements in the database to pDict(subject to the restriction that D ⊆ pDict), and not a
concrete lower bound as in the definition.
Theorem 3.2.5. The oblivious attack can enumerate all the elements in the database, with
confidence ε = 1− 1
2d′
and success probability δ ≈ 1, running in time O(2d +m(d′ − d)).
Proof. We would first like to prove that every element is retrieved with a confidence of
ε = 2
d′
n i.e., E[|D|/|pDict| ≥ 2
d′
n .
We see that for every element in the database, the surrounding region is an interesting
region. By construction of the Merkle tree, we know that every interesting region will have
proofs of length > d. Therefore, our algorithm does not miss any potentially interesting
region. Furthermore, we advocate a DFS of the pre-computed tree in the interesting region.
Therefore, we should always enumerate all the “yes instances” in the region. Each ”yes
instance” is of size at most 2k−d′ . Therefore, the set of all “yes instances” cover at most
m
2d′
fraction of randomly generated queries. Therefore, pDict will contain an expected nm
2d′
elements, m of which are definitely in the database. Therefore, we see that |D|/|pDict| ≥
2d
′
n .
Now to bound running time, we see that we required 2d many queries to enumerate
all proof-buckets (with high probability, the negligible case when it doesn’t happen is if
we directly hit an entry for the database or its sibling). Let us assume for convenience
that there are at most c-many positive instances in every interesting region. Furthermore,
37
for retrieving every “yes instance” we see from lemma 3.2.4 that we require an expected
1 + (d′ − (d+ blog cc))/2 many queries. Therefore, for m yes instances we require at most
m + m(d′ − (d + blog cc))/2 queries (we might require fewer because, for some instances
during the DFS we shall be starting with longer proofs). To account for the vestigial
queries made during the DFS, note that for c number of yes instances in an interesting
region, there are 2c(d′−(d+blog cc)) many terminal nodes (for which we could ask a query)
in the pre-computed Merkle tree. Therefore, there are at most 2m(d′ − d) such vestigial
queries made. Therefore, in total, we make an expected O(2d + m(d′ − d)) many on-line
queries.
Note: We have so far not defined what a confidence interval signifies. Assume that
on obtaining a dictionary, using the yes instances that have been computed thus far, an
adversary would like to identify elements that fall in the database. We see that number of
elements from the dictionary that are expected to fall in the bucket encapsulated by the
yes instance is n
2d′
. Thus, during the oblivious phase, the adversary can set d′ such that the
expected number of elements in the yes instance is small. For example, if the adversary is
fine with ε = 1/2, then d′ could be set to log n− 1.
Chapter 4
Oblivious Attacks and Epsilon Nets
In this chapter, we will present oblivious adversaries against Res belonging to certain
function classes. We believe that these function classes are a generic representation of
“efficient” responders. The two function classes discussed here are
1. The first is the set of all responders that use a set of proofs non-negligibly often.
The non-existence of each domain can be proved by exactly one proof in the set.
We believe these proofs are repeated non-negligibly often. This is the conventional
notion of responders. Such responders perform minimal online computation, as the
more frequent proofs can be precomputed. Both examples discussed in chapter 3 are
responders from this function class.
2. The second is the set of all responders that contains a set of precomputed proof
elements as its committed database CD. The proofs generated are subsets of CD.
We do not restrict the size of the proofs, thus arbitrary subsets of CD could be
valid proofs. Hence, there are 2|CD| many possible proofs. This function class is a
simplification of the function class where the responder doesn’t actively participate
in data hiding. All privacy related computations are performed by the authenticator.
Note that this simplification could be translated to proofs which use subsets of CD,
but don’t perform computations to hide these subsets.
For both the above function classes we construct oblivious attacks, where the learner
employs tools from computational geometry. In particular, the learner’s goal is to sample
the “Epsilon Net” of the given function classes. We shall provide the preliminaries from
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computation geometry in the subsequent section and then in later sections discuss the
relation between an attack for the aforementioned function classes and epsilon nets.
4.1 Preliminaries
Epsilon nets were introduced as a concept in randomized construction of a data-structure
to answer simplex range queries by Haussler and Welzl in [16]. All the definitions in this
section are taken verbatim from [16] (with a few notational changes) unless mentioned
otherwise.
Definition 7. A range space S is a pair (X,R), where X is a set and R is a set of subsets
of X. Members of X are called elements or points of S and members of R are called ranges
of S. S is finite when X is finite.
Other works in the field also refer to range spaces as hypergraphs. We will refer to the
same as range spaces and not hypergraphs.
Epsilon nets are defined over finite range spaces. They are simply samples of points
that contain at least one member from all sufficiently large ranges.
Definition 8. Let (X,R) be a range space, A a finite subset of X and ε ≥ 0. Then RA,ε
denotes the set of all r ∈ R that contain a fraction of the points in A of size greater than
ε, i.e., such that |A
⋂
r|
|A| > ε. A subset N of A is an ε-net of A (for R) if N contains a point
in each r ∈ RA,ε.
We are interested in bounds on the size of such epsilon nets, i.e., |Y |. The bounds
were proved in [16] by using a particular dimension on range spaces called the Vapnik-
Chervonenkis dimension.
Definition 9. Let S = (X,R) be a range space and let A ⊆ X be a finite set of elements
of S. Then ξR(A) denotes the set of all subsets of A that can be obtained by intersecting
a range of S, i.e.,
ξR(A) = {A
⋂
r : r ∈ R}
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If |ξR(A)| = 2|A|, then we say that A is shattered by R. The Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension
of S (in short the VC-dimension of S) is the smallest integer d such that no A ⊆ X of
cardinality d+ 1 is shattered by R. If no such d exists, then we see that the VC-dimension
of S is infinite.
An epsilon-net would be an useful tool if there were an efficient algorithm to construct
one. Fortunately, a random sampling of points gives us an epsilon-net with high proba-
bility. The sample size is independent of the size of the domain. The theorem is again
taken verbatim (with minor modifications for notational consistency and brevity) from [16,
Corollary 3.8].
Theorem 4.1.1. For any range space S = (X,R) of finite VC-dimension d, finite A ⊆ X
and ε, δ > 0, if N is the set of distinct elements of A obtained by k ≥ max{4ε log 2δ , 8dε log 8dε }
random independent draws from A, then N is an ε-net of A for R with probability at least
1− δ.
4.2 Polynomial Proofs
Note that the size of CD is polynomial in m, where m is the size of the database. Further,
all efficient schemes will require that the size of CD is O
(
m
)
. This follows from the design
consideration that DNSSEC shouldn’t add asymptotically significant overhead over DNS.
We will consider in this section, Res reuses certain proofs non-negligibly often. To
elaborate, let Π = {pi1, pi2 . . . pik} be some set of proofs, where k ≈ poly(m). Then, ∀CD,PK ,
∃Π, such that
Pr
pi∈Π
[x
R← DS : pi ← Res(CD,PK , x)] > εk
where εk is some system threshold (depending on the protocol), such that εk is a non-
negligible value in m. In short, Π contains proofs that occurs with probability greater than
εk. A graphical representation of such proofs is given Figure 4.1.
We make the following assumptions about our proofs here:
41
Figure 4.1: A graphical representation of repeated proofs. Every element in the domain
space is colour/texture-coded with the corresponding proof elements. For example, the
red-checkered proof proves the non-existence of an element x in the red-checkered region
in the domain-space.
1. Every proof element in Π proves the non-existence of at least ε fraction/region of the
entire domain space. This region need not be a continuous space.
2. Given D and PK , each domain name x 6∈ D maps to exactly one proof region i.e.,
falls in exactly one region. The proof of non-existence of x is the proof pi associated
to the said region. For example, if x lies is the solid filled(orange-filled region) of the
domain space in Figure 4.1, then the proof is the orange/solid-filled rectangle. In
other words, the regions are disjoint.
3. We assume that Pr[x
R← DS : pi ← Res(CD,PK , x)|pi ∈ Π] = Prpi∈Π[x R← DS : pi ←
Res(CD,PK , x)], i.e., adaptive choice of domains given their region is infeasible. In
other words, the distribution of proofs that we obtain is independent of the distribu-
tion of the sample of domains.
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4. We assume here that no pi ∈ Π also proves the existence of an element x in the
database. Even if it does, it proves the pair (x, y) exists in the database, where
y = D(x). The reason for the same is if indeed, it were to prove that only x ∈ D
(and not (x,D(x))), then we could trivially run our dictionary on the proof pi to learn
that x is in the database.
NSEC and NSEC3 falls in such a class of functions. In a gist, both these classes create
some ordering on D along with a signature on adjacent pairs in the ordering. CD contains
these adjacent pairs as proof elements. The proof set Π is the set of all elements in CD that
occur non-negligibly often, i.e., proofs where the range covered is sufficiently large. In the
case of NSEC, εk depends on the database at hand. For NSEC3, assuming random oracles,
we can expect evenly distributed ranges, so we could set εk ≈ 1/poly(m) for some poly(m).
For further details on NSEC3, we refer the readers to section 2.2 and for the corresponding
enumeration attack we refer the readers to 3.2.1.
The hybrid scheme (refer 2.3 and 3.2.2) , again falls in this category. In this case, the
proof set Π is the set of all paths of lengths at most log(1/εk) that represent proofs of
non-existence of a range(based on the outputs of the random oracle) of domains.
4.2.1 Relation to Epsilon Nets
Our oblivious adversary as defined in chapter 3 consists of the learner and the pruner. The
goal of the learner for this function class will be to learn to Π. The pruner in this case
eliminates elements from Dict, if in Π it can find the required proof of non-existence of x.
In that case, by Assumption 3, then the expected number of elements pruner will be able
prune from the dictionary, is at least kεk, i.e., pruner retrieves a pruned dictionary pDict,
such that |pDict| ≤ m+kεkn. Therefore, the oblivious adversary can prune to ε = mm+kεkn .
Therefore, we need the learner to collect samples sufficient to retrieve Π. We show that
the learner needs to sample an epsilon net in this case. Consider a range space defined as
follows:
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• Let S = (DS×CD, {pi : PK}) be the range space, where CD is the space of all possible
committed databases using the domains from the domain space DS. The set of all
ranges is represented by {pi : PK}. To elaborate, the range is nothing but the region
of domains (given a database D) whose non-existence in D is proved using the proof
pi.
• Every point in the range space is of the form (x,CD), for some element in the domain
and some committed database CD.
• The finite set A for which we would like to determine an epsilon net is determined
based on the input CD of the Responder. Given, CD, A is nothing but the set of all
domains in DS. More formally, A(D) = {(x,CD);∀x ∈ DS}.The set of all {pi : pi⋂A},
is determined by ∃x ∈ DS such that pi → Res(CD,PK , x). Our assumption is that
the ranges determined by pi is deterministic given CD. If random coins independent
of CD were to be used, it might contradict soundness. Note that, the verifier doesn’t
need to explicitly specify CD in this case, since it is implicitly included in A through
the responder’s input.
Note that , retrieving the proof pi just once, will give us the “knowledge” of all other
elements in the range. We get the knowledge of all other elements, because, for a ran-
domly sampled element x, we simply have to check that Ver(x,PK , pi)→ Valid (we mean
some output that isn’t Invalid). By soundness of the proof system, with overwhelming
probability, if valid, x is in the range, else it isn’t.
An εk-net of A(CD) will contain at least one sample for every proof pi that occurs with
probability > εk, i.e., the proof set Π. Therefore, we need to sample an εk-net (according
to definition 8) of domains and query on them.
Since, we assume that the proof regions/ranges (not the exact value of pi) can be
uniquely determined given CD, therefore, the VC dimension d for A(CD) is 1, i.e., d = 1.
Now, from theorem 4.1.1, an (δ, ε, n,m)-learner (where ε is as set earlier) queries the
responder with O(max{ 4εk log 2δ′ , 8εk log 8εk }) randomly sampled domains , to retrieve Π
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with probability at least 1− δ′, where δ′ = 1− δ.
Note that our assumption that CD uniquely determines the ranges, isn’t very restrictive.
In NSEC, the database D specifies the ranges. Similarly, in NSEC3, we can consider CD
to be the hashed database, along with the initial (random) salt. The same holds with the
pruned Merkle Tree of the hybrid scheme too. The assumption doesn’t disallow salts, but
it does restrict to one salt per CD. If the responder is allowed to use additional randomness
in an ad-hoc fashion to determine the region, soundness of the protocol may be adversely
affected (like in NSEC3). For example. in NSEC3, if each proof is allowed a different salt,
then for an overwhelming majority of salts, elements in the database D will yet be covered
by NSEC3 proofs.
4.3 Subset Proofs
In the previous section, we showed that no scheme which has proofs occur non-neglibly
often is secure against oblivious attacks. In this section, we consider the possibility of
exponentially many proofs. Note that to have exponentially many plausible proofs without
any online computation, some pre-computed component has to used non-negligibly often
to compute proofs. Therefore, we work with idea that each of these proofs have proof
components that occur non-negligibly often.
To elaborate, we consider CD to be a set of proof elements, and for every query x, the
proof pix ⊆ CD. Let Π = {c1, c2, . . . ck} be the subset of proof components from CD that
are repeated non-negligibly often. Therefore, again, we have ∀CD,PK ,∃Π, such that
Pr
c∈Π
[x
R← DS, pi ← Res(CD,PK , x) : c ∈ pi] > εk
where εk is some system threshold (depending on the protocol), such that εk is a non-
negligible value in m. In short, Π contains proof components that occur with probability
greater than εk.
A graphical representation of such proofs is given Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: A graphical representation of subset proofs. Every element in the domain space
is texture-coded with the corresponding proof elements. A region can be covered by more
than one component. The components covering a region are mapped to by arrows. The
proof contains all components covering a region.
The primary considerations here are:
1. Every proof component in CD covers a region of the domain space (just as in the
case of repeated proofs). CD consists entirely of proof components alone, there is no
additional secret.
2. Every domain can be covered by arbitrary number of proof components. But the
proof of non-existence of such a domain is the set of all components that cover the
domain. For example, in Figure 4.2, for a point x in the checkered region, the proofs
are nothing but the proof components represented by horizontal and vertical lines.
3. Given CD the region covered by each proof component can be uniquely determined,
i.e., there is no additional randomness employed by the responder in determining the
region.
4. This section again considers only negative proofs, i.e., , the said set of proof elements
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do not prove the existence of an element in the database.
5. Res (CD′,PK , x) will generate a valid proof if CD′ contains all proof components from
CD to generate the proof for x. In other words, if CD′ ⊂ CD, Res (CD′,PK , x) will
generate a valid proof for all x that falls in the ranges covered only by CD′.
The notion that the proofs are just sets of proof components is a simplification. This
can be generalised to say that the proofs reveal this aforementioned set of components.
This scenario will hold, when Auth is responsible for all data-hiding/privacy related com-
putations. As claimed in [5], confidentiality isn’t a DNSSEC goal. Thus, Res would ideally
perform minimal online computation for combining these components, and all confidential-
ity related computation would be delegated to Auth when it is generating those components.
We do not know of any protocols that fit this definition, but we feel it is the next logical
step given that using proofs that cover large ranges of domains aren’t private.
4.3.1 Learner and epsilon-nets
Again, we would like a learner that enumerates Π. The reasoning for the same will explained
in the following section, where we discuss the pruner. Again, we attempt to visualize the
proof system as a range-space. Again,
• Let S = (DS×CD, {c : PK}) be the range space, where CD is the space of all possible
committed databases using the domains from the domain space DS. The set of all
ranges is represented by {c : PK}. To elaborate, the range is nothing but the region
of domains (given a database D) covered by proof components c. The non-existence
of x in D is proved using a set of these components.
• Every point in the range space is of the form (x,CD), for some element in the domain
and some committed database CD.
• The finite set A for which we would like to determine an epsilon net is determined
based on the input CD of the Responder. Given, CD, A is nothing but the set of
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all domains in DS. More formally, A(D) = {(x,CD);∀x ∈ DS}.The set of all c, such
that c
⋂
A is c ∈ CD such that ∃x ∈ DS, c ∈ Res(CD,PK , x).
Given our assumption that CD uniquely determines the regions covered by every c ∈ CD,
we have VC dimension d = 1 for A(CD). If we eliminate this assumption, we don’t currently
know a bound on the VC dimension.
Therefore, for a database D, Π, consists of all the oft-repeating proof components.
Therefore, the learner would simply need to construct an εk-net, to enumerate Π. For
some parameter 0 < δ ≤ 1, the learner uses O(max{ 4εk log 2δ′ , 8εk log 8εk }) randomly sampled
domains , to enumerate Π ⊇ Π with probability at least 1− δ′, where δ′ = 1− δ.
4.3.2 Pruner and Π
The pruner in this case on receipt of Π 1 must be able to appropriately verify if a domain
x will lie in the ranges described by its proof components. Since, we assume that for all
CD′ ⊆ CD, Res(CD′,PK , x) can generate valid proofs for all regions covered exclusively by
CD′, we shall prune by simply running Res(Π,PK , x) for all x ∈ Dict. If it generates a
valid proof, we discard x from the dictionary.
For a reasonable CD, there must exist an Π that prunes a non-negligible fraction of
the elements. If not, then every proof requires at least one component that occurs with
probability < εk. This implies that CD contains at least 1/εk components. Thus, if
εk ≈ 1/n, the Responder stores at least n components. Since n >> m, the storage costs
render the proof system inefficient.
Therefore, for a sufficiently low εk, CD
′ should generate proofs for at least εk fraction
of the entire region (i.e., , the component set is overlaps on the same region). Thus, we
have a (δ, ε, n,m)-oblivious attacker, where ε > εk.
1It will receive Π ⊇ Π, but we assume for ease of analysis that Π = Π.
Appendix
Zero-knowledge Databases
Zero-knowledge elementary databases were introduced in [24]. It is a two-party protocol,
where the prover has the knowledge of an elementary database D which consists of tuples
of the form (x,D(x)). The verifier queries to the prover on some index x′ and the prover
returns a verifiable response which is either D(x′) or the absence of x′ in D.
Formally, a ZK-EDB can be defined as follows [10].
Definition 10. A ZK-EDB for the security parameter k on a simple database D (consisting
of tuples (x,D(x))), consists of the probabilistic polynomial time algorithms ZK-Setup,
P = (P1, P2), V described as follows:
ZK-Setup(1k). It receives the security parameter as input, it outputs σ (the CRS or the
public parameters).
P1(1
k, σ,D)→ (Comm,T ). P1 on receiving the security parameter (as a unary string),
the CRS and the database D as input, halts after outputting a public commitment
Comm and an associated secret/trapdoor T .
P2(1
k, σ, Comm,T, x)→ pix. P2 on receiving the security parameter, the CRS, the public
commitment, the secret and a query x, produces a proof of pix on D(x). (Note that,
D(x) =⊥ if for x, there is no d such that (x, d) ∈ D)
V (1k, σ, Comm, x, pix)→ y. V on receiving the security parameter, the CRS, the public
commitment, and an additional input of the query x along with its proof pix outputs
y. In this case y = D(x) (if it believes (x,D(x)) ∈ D), y = Out (if it believes that
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for x, there is no d such that, (x, d) ∈ D) or y = Invalid (if it finds that proof pix is
false).
P1 is the committer to the database, P2 is the prover and V is the verifier. The security
properties of a ZK-EDB are listed as follows:
Completeness Formally, completeness is the requirement that, if ZK-Setup(1k) → σ,
P1(1
k, σ,D) → (Comm,T ) and P2(1k, σ, Comm,T, x) → pix, then Pr[ V (1k, σ,
Comm, x, pix) → Invalid] ≤ (k) (where (k) is some value negligible wrt k).
Soundness Formally, soundness is the requirement that, if ZK-Setup(1k) → σ, then
for all efficient algorithms P ′(1k, σ) → (Comm′, pi1, pi2) and ∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗, Pr[V (1k,
σ, Comm′, x, pi1) 6= V (1k, σ, Comm′, x, pi2)
∧
V (1k, σ, Comm′, x, pi1) 6= Invalid∧
V (1k, σ, Comm′, x, pi2) 6= Invalid] ≤ ′(k) (where ′(k) is some negligible value
wrt k).
Zero-knowledge Let the verifier (possibly malicious) V run in two phases , i.e., V =
(V 1, V 2). Here V 1 takes as input the parameters generated and outputs the database
D, while V 2 is the interactive verifier (with additional input of some ”state” from
V 1). Then, there exists a simulator S with oracle access D with the restriction that
S queries the oracle on x only when it is queried for that x by the verifier V 2 that
simulates upto computational indistinguishability the view of the verifier V 2 when it
interacts with the actual prover P = (P1, P2), for any database D ← V 1(σ, 1k). The
view (or state) of V 2 from the transcript (σ,Comm, x1, pix1 , . . . , xn, pixn) obtained on
interacting with P = (P1(1
k, σ,D), P2(Comm,T, σ, x)) is computationally indistin-
guishable from the view of V 2 from the transcript (σ
′, Comm′, x1, pi′x1 , . . . , xn, pi
′
xn)
obtained on interacting with SIMD(1k), i.e., the distribution of the transcripts is
identical upto computational indistinguishability.
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